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AbstrAct
The primary purpose of this paper is to contribute to the current debate on 
the impact of the economic and financial crisis on public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). The crisis has caused a substantial fall in the PPP market. PPPs have 
been exposed to both financial and real impacts of the crisis. High interest rates 
and limited access to finance have been seen as the main factors reflecting 
the impact of the financial crisis on PPPs. In addition, due to the recession the 
decreased revenues of PPP projects have reduced their feasibility or impacted 
on their overall profitability. Measures adopted to help the PPP market in the 
analysed countries reveal that they mostly involve some form of government 
support. Further, the paper also critically examines the deficiencies of PPPs.
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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, public-private partnerships (PPPs1) have become 
increasingly popular in many countries, including in the EU. the total PPP 
market in the EU grew steadily until 2007 when the global financial crisis 
triggered a substantial fall of the market. More than 1,500 PPP deals were 
signed from 1995 to 2011, representing a total value of EUr 290 billion. 
the UK accounted for almost one-half of the market, followed by spain 
and France. Among new EU member states, the Polish PPP market remains 
* the paper was presented at the XX. Dnevi slovenske uprave 2013 conference.
1 PPPs can take many different forms such as BOT/BOO arrangements, joint ventures, leasing, 
contracting out and management contracts (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004, p. 10).
1.02 Review article
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the largest (Kappeler, 2012). In the EU PPPs have been created in the transport 
sector (road, rail) as well as in the areas of public buildings and equipment 
(schools, hospitals, prisons) and the environment (water/waste treatment, 
waste management) (EC, 2009, p. 3).
Traditional forms of government public funding and procurement continue to 
dominate the infrastructure market since PPPs only account for about 4% of 
all public sector investments (EC, 2009). However, the financial and economic 
crisis that started in 2008 has had multiple negative effects on governments’ 
finances. As a consequence of high public debt levels, high taxation, limited 
room to cut expenditures due to automatic stabilisers and lower tax receipts, 
the fiscal space has been reduced. All of these factors have limited the 
capacity of governments to fund infrastructure from the budget (Cuttaree & 
Mandri-Perrott, 2010). Despite this, a number of countries have announced 
investments in public infrastructure as a counter-cyclical measure. In addition, 
the European Commission recommended PPPs during the crisis as a means to 
foster investment (EC, 2009).
Nevertheless, the PPP market has also been hit by the financial crisis. In the EU 
it has shrunk by approximately 40%. The credit crunch has been seen as one of 
the main factors negatively affecting the PPP market. Even though there are 
some signs of improved market conditions, the PPP market is still well below 
the pre-crisis level. There has been a lot of discussion about measures that 
could be taken to help the PPP market. However, the suggested remedies 
largely involve certain forms of government support.
The aim of the paper is to examine the PPP market before and during the 
financial and economic crisis. In addition, the paper critically examines the 
deficiencies of PPPs. It also looks at whether any new innovative approaches 
to PPPs have been implemented as governments’ responses to the crisis.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 the advantages and 
disadvantages of PPPs are briefly presented. The problems that have arisen 
with PPPs in practice are also discussed. Section 3 investigates the impact 
and channels of the transmission of the recent financial crisis on PPP activity. 
Section 4 examines the possible responses of governments to help the 
PPP market. Further on, some new and innovative approaches to PPPs are 
presented for several countries. Finally, Section 5 briefly concludes.
2 The Pros and Cons of a PPP
There are several reasons governments decide to choose a PPP over traditional 
procurement. The main underlying motivation is to achieve improved value 
for money (VFM) or improved services for the same amount of money as the 
public sector would spend to deliver a similar project (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005, 
p. 346). Other advantages of using a PPP are that it enables the provision 
of infrastructure without increasing public sector borrowing, eases pressure on 
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the public sector budget, reduces the risk of a government arising from 
projects, to name just a few (Hodge, 2010). Some potential advantages and 
disadvantages of Private Finance Initiative deals in the UK are presented in 
Table 1.2
Table 1: Potential advantages and disadvantages of Private Finance Initiative 
deals
Advantages Disadvantages
There can be greater price certainty. The 
department and contractor agree the annual 
unitary payment for the services to be 
provided. This should usually only change as a 
result of agreed circumstances.
The department is tied into a long-term 
contract (often around 30 years). Business 
needs change over time so there is the risk 
that the contract may become unsuitable for 
these changing needs during the contract life.
Responsibility for assets is transferred to the 
contractor. The department is not involved in 
providing services which may not be part of its 
core business.
Variations may be needed as the department’s 
business needs change. Management of these 
may require re-negotiation of contract terms 
and prices.
PFI brings the scope for innovation in service 
delivery. The contractor has incentives to 
introduce innovative ways to meet the 
department’s needs.
There could be disadvantages, for example, if 
innovative methods of service delivery lead to 
a decrease in the level or quality of service.
Often, the unitary payment will not start until, 
for example, the building is operational, and 
so the contractor has incentives to encourage 
timely delivery of quality service.
The unitary payment will include charges for 
the contractor's acceptance of risks, such as 
construction and service delivery risks, which 
may not materialise.
The contract provides greater incentives to 
manage risks over the life of the contract than 
under traditional procurement. A reduced 
level or quality of service would lead to 
compensation paid to the department.
There is the possibility that the contractor 
may not manage transferred risks well. 
Or departments may believe they have 
transferred core business risks, which 
ultimately remain with them.
A long-term PFI contract encourages the 
contractor and the department to consider 
costs over the whole life of the contract, 
rather than considering the construction and 
operational periods separately. This can lead 
to efficiencies through synergies between 
design and construction and its later operation 
and maintenance. The contractor takes the 
risk of getting the design and construction 
wrong.
The whole life costs will be paid through 
the unitary payment, which will be based 
on the contractor arranging financing at 
commercial rates which tend to be higher than 
government borrowing rates.
Source: Corner (2005, p. 49)
In practice, the VFM in a PPP is questionable. Hodge and Greve (2009) review 
several international studies looking solely at improved VFM and find that the 
results are mixed.3 Several issues arise in VFM studies. The first question is: are 
the project alternatives directly comparable? The second issue is that in PPPs 
risk should be transferred to the private sector. This plays an important role in 
justifying PPPs. However, transferring risk is not without cost and estimating 
the monetary value of it is highly uncertain and often overestimated. In 
addition, the awareness that in the case a PPP fails completely the government 
will invariably bail it out, also creates moral hazard problems. This is especially 
2 PPPs where the private company is paid using public money and involve construction are 
known as private finance initiatives (PFI). This form has been widely used in the UK since 2000 
(Hrovatin, 2010, p. 88).
3 Also see Hodge & Greve (2007). The authors also warned of several deficiencies of studies 
(based on business case estimates, no control groups, unclear counterfactual of the traditional 
procurement, poor evaluative design features) and they should therefore be treated with 
considerable caution.
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problematic for essential services (e.g. air traffic control). Another troubling 
issue is the choice of the discount rate. Given the long-term nature of PPPs, 
the higher the discount rate, the more favourable the PPP will be compared 
to a public sector comparator. Further, transaction costs that can average out 
at over 20% of a total project value are often ignored. The quality of projects 
may also vary across alternatives (Hall, 2008; Boardman & Vining, 2010). 
A step forward in comparing alternatives would involve the use of total 
social cost. Total social cost includes production cost, transaction cost and 
the cost of externalities (e.g. quality) (Boardman & Vining, 2010). Boardman, 
Poschmann and Vining (2005) find that project complexity and uncertainty, 
asset specificity and the lack of contract management skills are the main 
causes of transaction costs. However, Boardman and Vining (2010) argue that 
the appropriate criteria for decisions should be based on allocative efficiency. 
They advocate the use of cost-benefit analysis to estimate the net social 
benefits of alternative projects.
While proponents of PPPs claim that projects are executed on time and on 
budget, the evidence suggests that this is not always the case. When PPPs 
perform well on this criterion, the question of the level of costs arises. 
PPPs use turnkey contracts which are much more expensive than ordinary 
contracts. The higher costs of a PPP reflect the higher payment required 
by a contractor to accept construction risk. When taking the whole process 
including negotiations into account, PPPs projects often last much longer 
than traditional procurements. A PPP contract will often be re-negotiated, 
resulting in higher costs. For instance, in the UK 33% of all PPP projects were 
renegotiated, leading to a 17% increase in their value in the 2004–2006 time 
period. The second problem with the »on time and on budget« criterion is 
that it focuses exclusively on the construction phase of the project (EPSU, 
2011; Boardman & Vining, 2010). 
In practice, some other deficiencies of PPP have also been observed like a lack 
of transparency, no greater efficiency than in the public sector and the failure 
to generate a better design than a traditional public procurement (EPSU, 
2011). The report that reviewed 100 international PPP projects (Mehra, 2005) 
provides additional evidence about the reasons for PPP delays, cost overruns, 
construction flaws, quality problems, legal disputes, failed contracts, 
bankruptcies and service cuts.
3 The Impact of the Financial Crisis on PPPs
The global financial crisis that started in mid-2007 has had a huge impact 
on all levels of the economy, including PPPs. After the PPP market in the EU 
reached its peak in 2006, both the aggregate value and number of projects 
have declined significantly. From 2006 to 2009 the number of PPPs dropped 
from 142 to 119 (i.e. by 16.2%), while their value decreased from EUR 27.6 
billion to EUR 16.3 billion, representing a massive 41% decline. While there 
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were some signs of the PPP market’s recovery in 2010, when the financial 
requirements of PPPs rose by 25%, they again declined in 2011 by 12% to 
reach the lowest level seen since 2003 (Kappeler, 2012).
One of the largest absolute declines in the number and value of projects 
during the recent crisis has been observed in the UK, the frontrunner in PPPs. 
Hence the UK’s share in the total number of PPP projects fell from 59% in 2007 
to 33% in 2011, while the UK’s share in the total value declined from 43% to 
18% in the same period (Kappeler, 2012). On the other side, there are a few 
exceptions (e.g. France) where the PPP market has expanded in recent years, 
indicating that the diversification of PPPs across countries has continued 
during the financial crisis. There have also been substantial differences in the 
progress of individual sectors. Transport remains the largest sector, although 
its relative importance is diminishing. In health and education, the decline has 
been higher than in other sectors, whereas new financing requirements for 
PPPs in environment-related projects increased in 2011 (Kappeler, 2012). The 
dramatic impact of the financial and economic crisis on the PPP activity has 
also been reported by non-EU countries (e.g. Australia, Canada).
The sheer value and number of PPP deals show the magnitude of the impact 
of the financial crisis on PPPs. There are several channels through which the 
financial crisis has been transmitted to PPP projects (see Table 2). PPPs are 
exposed to both the financial and real impacts of the crisis. Burer, Karpowicz 
and Coelho (2009, p. 5) define the threat as the probability that some negative 
event will occur, while the vulnerability relates to the preparedness of the 
partners involved to either prevent a threat from occurring or deal with its 
negative impact. For example, a decrease in traffic represents a threat to 
toll-road PPPs which could occur due to a recession, but the risk only arises 
when there is also a corresponding vulnerability (e.g. the lack of a minimum 
revenue guarantee) (Burer et al., 2009, p. 5). However, the impact also varies 
depending on a project’s development phase. PPP projects are generally 
developed in three phases. In the pipeline phase, the PPP is planned and 
may even be tendered, whereas the financial closure has not been reached 
and construction work has not started. In the construction phase the PPP 
is negotiated, but the construction of physical assets is still underway and 
service provision has not commenced. In the operational phase the PPP is 
negotiated, the construction phase is completed and services are provided 
(Burer et al., 2009, p. 4).
Several authors (e.g. Burer et al., 2009; PWC, 2008; Hall, 2009; Loxley, 2012) 
find that interest rates and access to finance have been the main channels of 
the financial crisis’ impact on PPPs. The spreads over Libor/Euribor between 
2007 and 2010 tripled to more than 250 bps (Kappeler, 2012). Such high 
interest rates not only affected projects in the pipeline phase, but also projects 
in the operational phase. Many PPPs raised short-term debts to start a project 
in expectation of later refinancing them at lower interest rates. In addition, 
due to the recession the decreased revenues of projects have reduced their 
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ability to repay the interest and loans or have impacted on overall profitability 
(Hall, 2009; PWC, 2008). Some projects were also financed by using a variable 
interest rate, which can also jeopardise a project’s profitability.
The financial crisis has also affected the quantity of loans available to PPPs. 
Despite the high interest rates, banks are hesitant in making or extending 
loans. However, even when bank loans were available they became more 
expensive, smaller, harder to obtain and with a shorter maturity. Data for 
projects financed with syndicated loans (including PPPs) reveal that in the first 
quarter of 2009 they decreased dramatically, most particularly in Western 
Europe. Such syndicated loans were replaced with »club« deals involving 
many banks each offering a smaller loan amount. However, this has had an 
adverse effect on the speed with which deals close (Lloyd, 2010; Loxley, 2012; 
EPEC 2009).
In addition to bank debt financing, bond financing has also been used.4  Before 
the crisis, 70% of the total financing requirements of PPPs were provided 
through loans, while bonds and equity represented an equal share. The use 
of bonds has differed widely among EU member states. This form has mainly 
been used in countries with well-developed private-sector pension schemes. 
Bonds (long-term assets) have been used to match the long-term liabilities 
of pension funds. Bond financing has mostly been widespread in the UK for 
very large projects. In the 1996–2009 time period, 72% of projects with a 
capital value exceeding £500 million were bond-financed. However, the PPP 
bond market was characterised by the use of monoline guarantees. These 
monoline insurance companies »wrapped« the bonds of project companies. 
Therefore, the project companies carried the same ratings as those of the 
monoline issuers. Since the ratings of these monoline companies (usually 
AAA) were much higher than the projects’ own ratings reflecting the higher 
risk, this led to a lower cost of funds. However, the downgraded monoline 
companies’ ratings during the financial crisis have shrunk the bond market 
for PPP projects. This has chiefly affected projects in the pipeline phase 
(Kappeler, 2012; Loxley, 2012; EPEC, 2010).
Several European and Asian countries (EAC) have depreciated their currencies 
against the euro during the crisis (Cuttaree & Mandri-Perrott, 2010). Since 
most of the financing for larger projects was obtained in a foreign currency 
this has negatively impacted PPP projects in operation.5
4 For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of bond financing compared to 
traditional bank financing, see EPEC (2010).
5 However, companies could use hedging, but in some emerging markets no forward markets 
exist for their currencies
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Table 2: Channels of the transmission of the financial crisis to PPP projects
Risk threat and vulnerability Risk realization
Threat Vulnerability Effect on private partners Effect on the government
Fi
na
nc
ia
l
Interest rates 
hike
Large borrowing 
or refinancing 
need; variable 
interest rates
Higher debt service = 
increasing costs; liquidity 
problems; questionable 
feasibility of some projects 
given lower returns.
Timing of investments 
(postponing); trade-
off between PPPs and 
traditional concessions 
altered. Possible cash flow 
support to corporates.
Unavailability 
of credit
Underfinanced 
project or new 
project
Lowered capacity to 
refinance; shorter loans; shift 
to bonds and equity vs. bank 
loans. Termination of existing 
projects, failure to achieve 
financial close of new 
projects; capital injections.
Revenues from 
the project and/or 
assets securitized; 
securities indexed, 
and insured.
Losses from downgrade of 
bonds; lowered capacity 
to refinance given lack of 
insurers; shorter loans and 
shift to bonds and equity vs. 
bank loans.
Decline in 
stock market 
prices
Companies do not 
hold sufficient 
levels of their 
capital in cash
Reduced capital of 
banks. Reduced lending; 
solvency problems and 
recapitalization.
Reduced investment for 
new and existing PPPs and 
recapitalization costs.
R
ea
l
Exchange rate 
depreciation
Sizable external 
debt, currency 
mismatches, 
dollarization
Corporate balance sheets 
if borrowing externally. 
Counterbalancing: increase 
in demand if service is export 
oriented (including highway). 
Higher input costs if inputs 
are imported.
Increased external 
debt service (financing 
constraints) and lower 
attractiveness for new 
investments relying on 
external borrowing; 
private sector defaults if 
widespread dollarization; 
call of guarantees. 
Counterbalancing force: 
switch from foreign 
consumption to domestic 
investment.
Slump in 
domestic 
demand
Commercial 
projects 
depending on 
user fees and 
explicit contractual 
guarantees
Corporate balance sheets 
and pricing of credit by 
financial partners; liquidity 
problem; contractor failure 
and pressure to renegotiate.
Lower domestic revenue 
(financing constraints) 
leading to lower investment 
affecting new and old PPPs; 
commercial projects risk; call 
of guarantees due to decline 
in fees/tolls; pressure to bail 
out failing contractors and 
renegotiate.
Source: Burer et al. (2009, p. 10)
A study of EAC countries reveals that since the financial crisis started the PPP 
market has changed in three main areas (Cuttaree & Mandri-Perrott, 2010, p. 
49):
• Project scope: the restricted financing and increased perception of risk 
has made the private sector more conservative with regard to PPP size 
and type.
• Funding and financing: securing financing is now more complex, 
requiring additional government financial support and guarantees, and 
reduced the potential of PPP projects’ off-balance-sheet arrangements.
• Commercial and procurement: the perception of higher risk is changing 
risk allocation between government and the private sector. Further, 
procurement process flexibility may need to increase to allow the 
concessionaire to reach financial closure.
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4 Response to the Crisis and New Innovative Approaches to 
PPPs
Although there are some signs of improved market conditions, the PPP 
market is still well below the pre-crisis levels. There has been a lot of discussion 
about measures that could be taken to help the PPP market. However, the 
suggested remedies mostly involve certain forms of government support. The 
government should only intervene when there are extreme circumstances 
beyond the control of the private partner so that PPPs still yield positive VFM 
and, most importantly, that the government is compensated for bearing 
the additional risk. The government can also use contingence clauses (»trip 
switches«) to ensure that measures are only temporary (Burer et al., 2009, pp. 
19–21). KPMG (2009) advocates that direct government support is required 
for all projects where refinancing is needed.
Several possible remedies are available to help PPPs during the crisis (Burer 
et al., 2009, p. 19): 
• concession extension: extends the tenure of the agreement to allow 
the private partner to generate the return needed to ensure the 
project’s viability;
• subsidy: output-based cash subsidies are the measure most 
transparently linked to the ultimate objective of the PPP. Alternatively, 
tax breaks could be used or subsidies could be paid either to the 
private partners or to direct users of the service (possibly in the form 
of vouchers);
• grant: extended to improve the attractiveness of a project and reduce 
the private partner’s overall exposure to risk;
• minimum revenue guarantee: ensures that the private partners can 
cover the repayment and service their debt liabilities;
• exchange rate guarantee: provides protection to a private partner in 
the case where the domestic currency depreciates significantly;
• debt guarantee: guarantees the repayment of all or part of the debt;
• subordinated loan: the government provides a standing loan facility on 
which the private partner can draw if necessary;
• equity measures: guarantees all or part of the equity values (the private 
partner can sell its equity stake to the government at an agreed price) 
or other measures to ensure equity; and
• step-in rights: in the case of a contractor’s failure governments may 
be able to step in and re-tender the PPP or may have to take over the 
operation.
In practice, the UK government established the Treasury Infrastructure 
Finance Unit (TIFU) in March 2009. The TIFU was not intended to replace 
bank/capital markets, but represents a potential source of liquidity for all PFI 
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projects facing finance-related delays. TIFU lending is thus only available to 
PPP projects which cannot secure sufficient finances to reach a close on a 
timely basis or where the funding offered to a project is »off-market«. The 
TIFU was intended to lend up to £2 billion by 2010, but it has only made 
one loan of £120 million to the Manchester Waste PFI project in April 2009. 
However, the TIFU also had a »shadow« role in other projects, facilitating their 
closure, since it was seen as a safety net in the case of funder withdrawal 
(Lloyd, 2010; Loxley, 2012).
In addition, the UK government replaced the PFI framework with Private 
Finance (PF2) to address past concerns with PFI and to respond to recent 
changes in the economic environment. PF2 introduced several new innovative 
approaches to PPP. To significantly strengthen the partnership between the 
public and private sector the UK government will look to act as a minority 
public equity co-investor in PF2 projects and introduce funding competitions 
for a proportion of equity to attract long-term investors into projects prior to 
their financial closure. In addition, to improve the VFM there will be greater 
management of risks by the public sector, including the risk of additional 
capital expenditure arising from an unforeseeable general change in law, 
utilities’ costs, site contamination and insurance. Further, under PF2 several 
measures have been implemented to improve the flexibility, transparency 
and efficiency of services (HM Treasury, 2012).6
The French government has taken two approaches to support the PPP market. 
The first measure was to provide EUR 10 billion in government guarantees, 
which was only applicable to 80% of the private sector financing required for 
PPPs. In addition, the state-backed Caisse des Depots was allowed to provide 
EUR 8 billion of loans to infrastructure projects. Further, the government also 
relaxed the requirements for projects to finalise their financing arrangements 
(Loxley, 2012).
In response to the financial crisis the Korean government has adopted 
several measures (Burer et al., 2009, p. 18), namely: (i) lower equity capital 
requirements on concessionaires (5–10%); (ii) for large-scale projects higher 
ceilings on guarantees provided by the Infrastructure Credit Guarantee 
Fund (50%); (iii) help in changing equity investors for some projects; 
(iv) compensation for the preparation of proposals to encourage more 
vigorous competition during bidding; (v) sharing of interest rate risks with 
concessionaires; (vi) compensation for excess changes in base interest rates 
through the grading of risks at the time of the concession agreement; and (vi) 
shorter periods for readjusting benchmark bond yields.
In Canada, the CAD 1.26 billion PPP Canada Fund was established. The fund 
can offer loans or loan guarantees and non-repayable or repayable financial 
contributions (Loxley, 2012). In Australia some new innovative approaches 
6 A detailed description of PF2 is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information, see HB 
Treasury (2012).
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have been used as well. In the South East Queensland Schools project the 
supported debt model has been employed. Accordingly, the Queensland 
Treasury Corporation (QTC) will refinance 70% of the project’s financing. 
The QTC estimated that 70% is the level at which full recovery is highly likely 
should the project ever go into default. The remainder of the finance (debt 
and equity) is subordinated to the QTC debt. The private sector debt thus 
bears substantially more project risk than normal senior debt (KPMG, 2009).
5 Conclusions
PPPs have become increasingly popular in many countries in the last two 
decades. There has been a lot of discussion about the advantages of PPPs over 
traditional procurement. The main underlying reason is to achieve improved 
VFM. However, in practice the VFM in a PPP is questionable since evidence of 
improved VFM in PPP projects is diverse. In addition, the paper reveals there 
are many contentious issues in the VFM analysis referring to the comparability 
of alternative projects, transferring the risk, moral hazard and the discount 
rate. Since transaction costs are often ignored in the VFM analysis some 
authors propose using total social cost, which in addition to production cost 
includes transaction cost and the cost of externalities. They also argue that 
appropriate criteria for decisions should be based on allocative efficiency and 
advocate the use of cost-benefit analysis to estimate the net social benefits of 
alternative projects. Further, in practice some other deficiencies of PPPs have 
also been observed like a lack of transparency, no greater efficiency than in 
the public sector, delays, cost overruns, construction flaws, quality problems, 
legal disputes, failed contracts, bankruptcies and service cuts. Thus, PPP is not 
a panacea that can be used in all circumstances to foster investments due to 
governments’ reduced fiscal space.
The global financial and economic crisis has caused more than a 40% decrease 
of the PPP market in the EU. A similar negative pattern has also been observed 
in other non-EU countries. PPPs have been exposed to both the financial and 
real impacts of the crisis. High interest rates and more limited access to finance 
have been seen as the main factors of the financial crisis’ impact on PPPs. In 
addition, due to the recession the decreased revenues of PPP projects have 
reduced their feasibility or impacted on their overall profitability. The impact 
of the crisis has varied depending on the development phase of a particular 
PPP project.
Consequently, several governments have intervened in order to help the 
PPP market during the crisis. The analysis of selected countries revealed 
that several measures have been applied such as direct loans, lower 
equity requirements, the sharing of interest rate risk, co-investments, loan 
guarantees, relaxed requirements for projects etc. However, the remedies 
largely involve some form of government support, which raises the issue of 
adequate compensation for bearing the additional risk.
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Povzetek
VpliV finančne in gospodarske krize na 
jaVno-zasebna partnerstVa*
Ključne besede:  javno-zasebno partnerstvo, javni sektor, finančna kriza, inovacije
v zadnjih dveh desetletjih so postala javno-zasebna partnerstva (JzP) zelo 
priljubljena v mnogih državah, tako tudi v EU. V obdobju od 1955 do 2011 je 
bilo v EU podpisano več kot 1.500 pogodb JZP v skupni vrednosti 290 milijard 
EUR. Pri tem je Velika Britanija (VB) obsegala skoraj polovico trga JZP. Kljub 
priljubljenosti uporabe JZP pa pri financiranju infrastrukturnih projektov 
tradicionalno javno financiranje infrastrukture še vedno prevladuje, saj JZP 
pomeni samo 4 % vseh investicij v infrastrukturo.
Obstaja vrsta razlogov, ki govorijo v prid uporabe JZP. Med glavnimi razlogi 
je predvsem doseganje boljše vrednosti za denar (VZD) oziroma izboljšanje 
kakovosti storitev za enak obseg sredstev, kot bi jo dobili pri tradicionalnem 
financiranju investicij. V članku so navedene številne druge potencialne 
prednosti in slabosti JZP. V praksi se je izkazalo, da je tudi argument o višji VZD 
pri JZP vprašljiv, saj so analize primerov iz prakse podale različne rezultate. 
Poleg tega se pri analizi VZD pojavlja veliko dilem glede primerljivosti 
alternativnih projektov, prenosa tveganja, moralnega hazarda in diskontne 
stopnje. Poleg tega se velikokrat zanemarijo tudi transakcijski stroški, ki 
lahko presegajo tudi 20 % vrednosti projekta. Pri tem se lahko razlikuje tudi 
kakovost primerjanih projektov. Tako nekateri avtorji predlagajo, da je pri 
analizi VZD treba uporabiti skupne družbene stroške, ki poleg proizvodnih 
stroškov vsebujejo tudi transakcijske stroške in stroške eksternalij. Hkrati 
zagovarjajo, da bi morali biti kriteriji pri odločanju oblikovani na podlagi 
alokacijske učinkovitosti in priporočajo uporabo analize stroškov ter koristi pri 
oceni neto koristi alternativnih projektov.
V praksi so se v mnogih primerih pokazale tudi nekatere druge pomanjkljivosti 
JZP, kot so pomanjkanje preglednosti, prekoračitev stroškov gradnje, zamude, 
zmanjšanje kakovosti storitev, stečaji itd. Izkušnje z JZP tako kažejo, da kljub 
manjšim možnostim financiranja investicij iz javnih sredstev JZP ni vedno 
primerna rešitev za spodbujanje investicij.
Svetovna finančna in gospodarska kriza je povzročila, da se je vrednost JZP v 
EU zmanjšala za več kot 40 %, število pogodb JZP pa je upadlo za več kot 16 %. 
Kljub rahlemu okrevanju leta 2010 se je v letu 2011 sklepanje JZP ponovno 
zmanjšalo. Pri tem je med krizo v VB prišlo do največjega absolutnega upada 
tako števila kot vrednosti JZP. Po drugi strani pa obstaja tudi nekaj izjem (npr. 
Francija), kjer je prišlo do rasti JZP. O negativnem vplivu krize na JZP poročajo 
tudi iz drugih držav izven EU (npr. Avstralija in Kanada).
* Prispevek je bil predstavljen na konferenci XX. Dnevi slovenske uprave 2013.
91Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, letnik XI, št. 2/2013
The Impact of the Financial and Economic Crisis on Public Private Partnerships
JZP je bilo izpostavljeno tako finančnemu kot realnemu vplivu krize. Velikost 
vpliva krize na JZP je odvisno tudi od razvojne faze, v kateri se posamezni 
projekt nahaja (priprava, gradnja, obratovanje). Visoke obrestne mere in 
dostop do financiranja sta glavna dejavnika vpliva finančne krize na JZP. Kljub 
visokim obrestnim meram so banke oklevale pri dajanju novih ali podaljšanju 
obstoječih posojil. V primeru, da so bila posojila vendarle na voljo, pa so 
bila ta veliko dražja, manjša in s krajšo ročnostjo. Poleg posojil se je JZP 
financiralo tudi s pomočjo obveznic, ki so bile najbolj razširjene predvsem v 
VB. Znižanje kreditnih ocen izdajateljev obveznic je povzročilo močno skrčenje 
trga obveznic za financiranje JZP. Hkrati so se zaradi recesije zmanjšali tudi 
prihodki iz projektov JZP, kar je vplivalo na njihovo dobičkonosnost oziroma 
zmanjšalo njihovo izvedljivost.
Kljub temu, da so se že pojavili nekateri znaki izboljšanja poslovnih razmer, je 
dejavnost JZP še vedno precej pod ravnjo, ki je bila dosežena pred krizo. Zato 
se je pojavilo veliko razprav o mogočih ukrepih za spodbujanje JZP, ki so v 
članku tudi na kratko predstavljeni.
Analiza izbranih držav je pokazala, da so se uporabljali različni ukrepi. V 
nekaterih državah so ustanovili državne sklade, ki zagotavljajo posojila 
projektom JZP. Poleg tega skladi ali država zagotavljajo tudi garancije za 
posojila, vendar v večini primerov samo do določene vrednosti in ne za celotno 
posojilo. Hkrati so bili sprejeti tudi ukrepi za porazdelitev obrestnega tveganja 
in zmanjšanje zahtev za višino lastniškega kapitala pri pridobitvi koncesij. 
Tudi pri pripravah projektov za JZP so bili uvedeni določeni ukrepi. Tako so 
znižali merila glede dokončne vzpostavitve finančne konstrukcije projekta v 
pripravljalni fazi. Prav tako so za zagotovitev večje konkurence med ponudniki 
za vstop v JZP uvedli povrnitev stroškov priprave ponudb. V večini primerov 
so ukrepi obsegali neko obliko državne podpore. Pri tem je pomembno, da 
se v primeru poseganja države v JZP zagotovi, da država dobi tudi ustrezno 
nadomestilo za prevzemanje dodatnega tveganja.
